16 August 2026
Executive Summary
Hurricane Lala has provided an unusually clear demonstration of compound infrastructure risk.
The Category 1 hurricane passed close to Hawaii’s Big Island on Saturday, bringing intense rainfall, flooding, damaging winds and widespread power disruption.
More than 42,000 electricity customers were without power during the storm, while Hilo International Airport and Kona International Airport were closed. Commercial ports across Hawaii Island, Maui County and Kaua‘i were also closed as authorities responded to the deteriorating conditions.
Roads were also affected by flooding, fallen trees and downed power lines.
The important commercial lesson is not the hurricane itself.
It is that supposedly independent contingency arrangements can fail simultaneously because they rely upon the same underlying infrastructure.
UK Impact
UK companies with international operations commonly establish alternative suppliers, warehouses and transport providers as part of business-continuity planning.
But businesses should determine whether those alternatives share the same:
- Airport.
- Port.
- Electricity network.
- Road corridor.
- Telecommunications infrastructure.
- Fuel depot.
- Distribution centre.
- Bridge or tunnel.
A backup supplier located ten miles from the primary supplier may provide very little resilience if both become inaccessible during the same event.
The same principle applies within the UK.
Flooding, storms, power failures and other infrastructure events can simultaneously interrupt several apparently separate contingency options.
Global Impact
Hawaii illustrates the particular vulnerability of island economies and geographically constrained locations.
When airports, ports, roads and electricity networks are disrupted simultaneously, businesses cannot necessarily solve the problem simply by changing transport mode.
The Hawaii Tourism Authority advised travellers that both major Big Island airports were closed during the storm, with flight cancellations expected to continue even as operations began recovering.
Meanwhile, fallen trees damaged transmission infrastructure over a lengthy section of the Hamakua Coast, creating the possibility of prolonged electricity restoration.
The consequences of an event can therefore continue after the immediate physical danger has passed.
Our View
Business-continuity plans should be tested for correlated failure.
Companies should ask:
- Does our alternative supplier use the same port?
- Does our backup warehouse rely on the same electricity grid?
- Can employees reach the site if the primary road is closed?
- Can goods leave by another transport mode?
- Where does emergency generator fuel come from?
- Can that fuel still reach the site during disruption?
- Do telecommunications providers share physical infrastructure?
- How long can operations function without external electricity?
- Are alternative airports or ports genuinely accessible?
- Have several contingency measures unknowingly been built around the same dependency?
Having Plan A and Plan B is not enough.
Businesses need to know whether the same event can disable both.
Risk Indicator: HIGH
Disclaimer
The information contained within these Market Alerts is provided for general market awareness and informational purposes only. It does not constitute financial, legal, investment, regulatory or insurance advice. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure accuracy at the time of publication using multiple reputable and independently verified sources, geopolitical events, legislation, regulation and market conditions may change rapidly. Readers should obtain appropriate professional advice before acting upon any information contained herein.
Invictus Risk Solutions LLP – Helping organisations stay ahead of emerging risks through informed insight and independent analysis.